Making Billions from War
When examining Russia’s war in Ukraine and NATO’s support for Ukraine, one question stands out: why have the basic principles of warfare not been applied more decisively? In most conflicts, each side attempts to disrupt the other’s supply lines. This was standard practice in the First World War, the Second World War, and many other conflicts, yet it has not been fully achieved in this one.
At the beginning of the war, Russia appeared to focus primarily on securing regions where many residents were ethnic Russians and where separatist movements sought closer ties with Russia. Russian forces concentrated heavily in those areas while also using aircraft, missiles, and drones against selected targets. Meanwhile, military supplies continued to enter Ukraine across its western borders and, to some extent, by sea. Nearly four and a half years into the conflict, Russia still has not fully stopped that flow. The result has been a prolonged war and Ukraine’s growing ability to launch drones deep into Russian territory, including toward Moscow and St. Petersburg.
This raises a difficult question: has the continuation of the war become profitable for the military-industrial complex and the multibillion-dollar corporations that supply weapons?
Had the major supply routes been successfully cut off, the war might have ended much sooner. Instead, the conflict has continued for almost four and a half years, generating enormous revenues for corporations that benefit from sustained military spending.
Corruption in Ukraine also deserves scrutiny. It did not begin with the current war; concerns about corruption existed for many years beforehand, and Western news organizations frequently described Ukraine as one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. Nevertheless, Western governments have continued to provide weapons and financial assistance, even amid reports that some weapons have been stolen, diverted, or resold.
Again, the question must be asked: why?
This supports the broader argument that the longer the war continues, and the less accountable the system becomes, the greater the opportunity for profit.
Since the Korean War, weapons from various conflicts have repeatedly reached black markets and fallen into the hands of armed groups, including organizations described as extremist by governments or the media. This cycle creates substantial profits for weapons manufacturers.
How does the theft and resale of weapons benefit those who profit from war? The answer is straightforward: missing weapons must be replaced. This applies not only to weapons destroyed in combat but also to those that never reach the battlefield. Their disappearance creates additional demand and leads to further orders.
The cycle can also expand future conflicts. When weapons are diverted to other countries or armed groups, the United States and its allies may eventually find themselves confronting forces equipped with those same weapons. That confrontation then creates demand for even more military equipment. A war cannot continue without armed opponents, so the cycle moves from one conflict to another.
Are we really to believe that, over the past seventy-six years, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and other European countries have been unable to identify who is stealing weapons, who is purchasing them, and where they are being sent? This question alone strengthens the argument that war has become a business.
A short book with that exact title, War Is a Racket, was written many years ago by retired U.S. Marine Corps Major General Smedley D. Butler. It remains widely available online and is worth reading.
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries are often able to identify drug traffickers, trace their networks, and disrupt their supply routes. These investigations frequently involve individuals who blend into the general population and operate within large, complex networks. By comparison, the number of governments, organizations, and wealthy buyers capable of purchasing advanced weapons is far smaller. Such transactions involve limited groups with the money, access, and connections necessary to complete them.
When a single weapon system costs one million dollars, fifty million dollars, or more, relatively few buyers can afford it. A person reselling stolen weapons may also offer a substantial discount because the weapons cost that seller nothing. If even the discounted price is beyond the means of a small armed group, a government or wealthy sponsor may provide the money. When a future conflict against a particular country is anticipated, the expectation of later profits may encourage such support.
Finally, governments often borrow money to finance military spending and pay weapons manufacturers. In this process, money is created through credit, while the principal and interest must eventually be repaid. This allows financial institutions, as well as arms manufacturers, to benefit from prolonged conflict.
For these reasons, the argument that war is a racket remains difficult to dismiss